NFC and screen unlocking for mobile devices (part II)

[continued from part I]

Authenticating the tag

Any access control solution whether for physical spaces, local devices or network resources in the cloud has to confront the question of security assurance. What is the level of confidence that the person being granted access is indeed the legitimate user verses an attacker impersonating them? There is no right or wrong answer per se but a spectrum of levels depending on the authentication protocol used. Different protocols exhibit different levels of resistance against common risks.

Threat model

In the case of NFC tags, a reasonable threat model includes:

  • Passive eavesdropping: Listening on the NFC exchange between the legitimate user and a legitimate reader.
  • Skimming: Bumping into the user with a malicious reader to trigger some action against the tag. Note that in this case the attacker must also activate the tag by providing enough power via the reader. By contrast passive eavesdropping assumes there is another reader in range already powering the tag and only requires capturing the RF emanations.
  • Extended physical access:  This can be viewed as an extended version of skimming, where the attacker has possession of the NFC tag for an extended period of time to perform more intrusive attacks, including destructive ones that may involve prying open the chip in an irreversible way.
  • Social engineering: tricking the user into tapping their NFC tag against a malicious reader. This is a variant of skimming where the user is voluntarily performing the tap operation, defeating any shielding mechanism that may exist to deter unauthorized reading.

Choosing a tag

There is a dizzying array of different NFC tags offering a broad spectrum of security and storage options. Within the Mifare family alone there is the original “Classic,” then there is Mifare Plus, DESfire, EV1, Ultralight and Ultralight-C to name a few of the popular offerings. All of them present a sector-oriented data storage mechanism, with available space (ranging from a few dozen bytes to several KB) divided into “sectors.” The wire protocol over NFC defines commands for reading/writing blocks of data into these sectors.

Main differentiating feature between tag types is the access control mechanism they can support around data. In the simplest case such as Ultralight tags, all data on the tag is world-readable and world-writable. Anyone armed with an NFC reader– that includes an Android device these days– can read all data from the tag in a fraction of a second. This may sound like a security vulnerability but it is very often exactly the intended outcome. For example an NFC-enabled poster in a public setting bearing a URL is meant to be readable by anyone in the vicinity. There is no reason to restrict read access.

One step above that is rudimentary access control for making contents read-only. This is an irreversible transition that prevents future updates to data, which is useful in the previous example of tag left unattended in public space. Locking the tag prevents “vandalism” by random strangers overwriting contents with a different URL for example. However it does not help with keeping their contents secret.

More advanced tags such as the Classic and DESfire feature an access control based on cryptography. Instead of being an open book where any sector can be read by anyone, the chip is configured such that the contents of particular sector is only readable given knowledge of an associated secret key. (Strictly speaking there are two keys per sector, one for reading contents and one for writing, as well as changing the keys.) Before a reader can read data out of that sector, it must authenticate to the tag by proving knowledge of the associated secret key.

NFC ring

At the time of writing NFC Ring uses two NTAG203 tags labeled “public” and “private.” While the nomenclature is reminiscent of key pairs in public-key cryptography, the parallel is deceptive. Much like the Mifare Ultralight, NTAG203 provides absolutely no security protection for stored data. They are trivially cloned by reading out all sectors and writing them into another NTAG203 tag. If the user holds up their ring to hostile reader just once (think social engineering– “tap your ring here to earn free iTunes”) or someone bumps them with an NFC reader on the subway, or even passively intercepts 1 exchange between tag and legitimate reader, the attacker has all necessary information required to create a perfect clone.

According to comments from the designer, there is physical protection built into the design to make the private tag more difficult to read. This may combat skimming attacks in the same way that metallic sleeves on US passports prevent them from being read unless the covers are opened. On the other hand it would provide no defense against social-engineering, eavesdropping or physical access risk vectors since the private tag is being deliberately exposed in that scenario.

About the only tricky part is cloning the unique ID or UID assigned to the chip. These four or seven byte identifiers are burnt-in at manufacture time and can not be changed on a chip complying with the specification; effectively they reside on a read-only sector.  That last phrase about compliance however turns out to be the operative part. Already unlicensed Chinese versions of Mifare tags exist where the UID can be overwritten to any arbitrary value. For that matter a dedicated hardware device such as the ProxMark can be programmed to emulate any tag and reply to the reader with arbitrary responses, including a forged value UID.

The final post in this series will look at possible improvements using one of the more advanced tag types.



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