What is wrong with Apple Pay? NFC and cross-channel fraud (1/2)


Several news stories have “discovered” that Apple Pay has not, in fact, spelled the end of credit card fraud and may even have created new opportunities. That seems surprising considering that NFC payments were supposed to be an improvement over magnetic-stripe swipes in terms of security, using a cryptographic protocol that prevents reusing information stolen from one merchant to make additional fraudulent transactions at another one. Much of the problem turns out to be usual sad state of technology journalism. It is not that NFC or EMV have a new vulnerability that is being exploited against hapless iPhone users. (To be fair, EMV does have its fair share of security weaknesses and mobile payments have introduced some incremental risks, but those subtleties are not what has the press riled up.) Apple has not created a new way to steal credit-cards. But it has created a more effective avenue for monetizing already stolen cards. Apple Pay is not the vulnerability— it is just one particular technique for exploiting an ancient one.

Online vs in-store transactions

Going back to our summary of how credit-card payments operate, we differentiated between two types of transactions:

  • Card-present, or more colloquially “in-store.” The customer walks up to a cash registers and hands over their card to the merchant. That card can be “read” in different ways. At the low-tech end of the spectrum is old-school mechanical imprinting, creates an actual carbon-copy of the front of the card bearing embossed numbers. More common is the “swipe” where information encoded in the magnetic-stripe at the back of the card is scanned by moving the card through a magnetic field. Finally if the card has a smart chip, there is the EMV option of executing a complex cryptographic protocols between card/terminal. In these cases each interaction is unique and the data observed by the terminal different, unlike a magnetic-stripe which has the same information every time.
  • “Online,” or what used to be called phone-order/mail-order back when picking up a telephone or sending pieces of paper via USPS did not seem such an antiquated concepts. Generically this class is known as “card-not-present” transaction, because the merchant does not have the actual piece of plastic in hand when placing the charge. (We will avoid the term “online” because in payments it is also used to describe when a point-of-sale terminal is communicating in real-time with card network, as opposed to batching up transactions for later submission.)

Containing fraud

From a fraud perspective, the key observation is that each modality exchanges slightly different information with the terminal. All of them share the same basic data such as credit-card number and expiration. But each one also introduces a unique twist. Track-data on magnetic stripe has a 3-5 digit “card validation code” commonly called CVV1. Online transactions use a different value called CVV2, printed on the card itself but not encoded in the magnetic-stripe. Meanwhile the basic version of EMV simulates the action of swiping for “track-data” for backwards compatibility, but substitutes a dynamic CVV or CVV3 which changes each time in a manner unpredictable without knowing the cryptographic secret stored in the chip.

A corollary of this difference is that it acts as a natural “firewall” between channels. Fraud remains largely contained to its original channel. Consider the criminals who popped Target or HomeDepot point-of-sale terminals in the past. This attack allowed to them amass a cache of raw track-data from magnetic-stripes swiped at those cash registers. That information can be used to create convincing replicas of cards that will behave exactly like the original card when swiped through a reader. But there is no CVV2 encoded in the magnetic-stripe.** That is a limiting factor if our criminals wanted to monetize those cards online, instead of walking into a store. Most websites these days will collect and validate CVV2 for online orders. (As an aside, there trade-offs in both avenue for monetization. In-store fraud is harder to scale because it requires recruiting mules to run the risk of walking into a store with fake cards, with their faces captured on camera. Online fraud scales better; there is no limit to how many websites you can drive to or how many big-box items can fit into the trunk. Downside is delivery involves a shipping address that can be traced- notice how many ecommerce sites flat out refuse shipping to PO boxes.)

[continued]

CP

** Some merchants have started asking for or keying in CVV2 by looking at the card during retail transactions. That is a dangerous pattern. It may help that particular merchant reduce fraud temporarily by doing additional verification on the card, but it weakens the overall ecosystem by putting card-not-present at greater risk against compromised terminals.

One thought on “What is wrong with Apple Pay? NFC and cross-channel fraud (1/2)

  1. Can’t you guys win solely on technical merits? Forced to publicly attack your concurrent by name at the edge seems a bit on the losing track to me. Moreover, the problem with this strategy is when you attack them you also attack yourself because you undermine the trust of the non-technical users on all this kind of payments not only theirs. It’s short sighted.

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